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Abstract
Arising out of UNHCR’s Global Consultations was a re-
newed emphasis on the role of resettlement as a protection
tool, durable solution, and burden-sharing mechanism.
Resettlement is a useful instrument for all three reasons
enumerated by UNHCR. Its malleability, however, also
makes it prone to manipulation. It can be, and has been,
used by states to obfuscate an unwillingness to meet their
international legal obligations through a replacement of
refugee protection by migrant selection. The argument is
made here for why resettlement is a necessary component
of refugee protection, particularly in the current period of
securitization following the events of 11 September 2001.
This is followed by a discussion of the dangers of the abu-
sive use of resettlement to the overall refugee protection
scheme. Models for more structured resettlement are ex-
amined with a view to understanding what reform is
needed. In conclusion, recommendations for resettlement
reform are provided.
Résumé
Suite aux Consultations mondiales du HCR, on a assisté
à un regain d’emphase sur la réinstallation comme ins-
trument de protection, comme solution durable et
comme mécanisme de partage international de la charge.
La réinstallation est un instrument utile pour chacune
des trois raisons énumérées par le HCR. Cependant, sa
malléabilité la rend aussi susceptible à la manipulation.
Elle peut-et cela a déjà été le cas-être utilisée par certains
états pour dissimuler leur réticence à honorer leurs enga-
gements légaux internationaux en substituant la sélec-
tion des migrants à la protection des réfugiés. L’article
met de l’avant des arguments démontrant pourquoi la ré-
installation est un élément essentiel pour la protection
des réfugiés, en particulier en la présente période de “ sé-
curisation ” suivant les événements du 11 septembre
2001. Une discussion s’ensuit sur les dangers de l’utilisa-
tion abusive de la réinstallation au détriment du cadre
global de protection des réfugiés. Pour conclure, des mo-
dèles de réinstallation plus structurée sont examinés dans
le but de déterminer les réformes requises.
A
refugee, by definition, is an individual who has fled
his or her homeland on the basis of a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group, or politi-
cal opinion.1 While the refugee definition applies equally to
all who are found to meet it, the protection attached to
refugee status can differ greatly. Protection ranges from new
citizenship to crowded camps. The determining factor is
where refugee status is claimed. The Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) obliges signatory
states to not refoule refugees who have arrived within the
state’s territory.2 While signatory states grant refugee status
and sometimes citizenship to the refugees who reach their
shores, other states, often overwhelmed by refugees and
determined to discourage further flows, have not signed the
Refugee Convention.
In signatory states, refugee protection is conferred under
domestic legislation once the state determines that an indi-
vidual meets the refugee definition. In non-signatory states
that lack similar refugee laws or status determination pro-
cedures, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees (UNHCR) may grant mandate refugee status under the
Statute of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees.3 UNHCR then seeks “durable solutions” for refugees.
Durable solutions comprise local integration in the receiv-
ing country,  voluntary repatriation to one’s country of
origin where the situation has changed so as to make this a
possibility, or resettlement to another country.4 Where
35
neither local integration nor repatriation is possible, reset-
tlement is the only option.
Resettlement requires a third country to be willing to
accept refugees into its territory. While signatory states to
the Refugee Convention have promised not to refoule asylum
seekers at their borders, they have not committed to accept
refugees for resettlement. Too many of the world’s refugees
are therefore left to linger in non-durable conditions in
countries of first asylum that are often only minimally safer
than the countries they have fled. This article provides an
examination of resettlement and an argument for its in-
creased use as a tool of protection and responsibility-shar-
ing while also warning against resettlement’s vulnerability
to manipulation.
Resettlement
As it approached its fiftieth anniversary in 2001, UNHCR
was in the midst of an identity crisis. States that were the very
authors of the Refugee Convention were vocally challenging
its continued relevance and surreptitiously evading their
obligations.5 In both response to the crisis and in celebration
of the anniversary, UNHCR initiated the Global Consult-
ations on International Protection (Global Consultations)
to address the situation through ministerial meetings, expert
roundtables, and policy formulation.6 One of the key devel-
opments to arise out of the resulting Agenda for Protection
was a renewed emphasis on the role of resettlement.7
Resettlement is defined by UNHCR as “the selection and
transfer of refugees from a State in which they have sought
protection to a third State which has agreed to admit them
– as  refugees – with permanent residence status.”8 The
decision to resettle a refugee is only made in the absence of
other options – local integration or repatriation.9 There is
an undercurrent of debate as to whether resettled refugees
should be granted permanent residence.10 Nor does refugee
resettlement only occur through arrangements between
UNHCR and states. It can also occur in certain countries
through referrals from organizations other than UNHCR
or through private sponsorship by an organization or indi-
vidual of the third state. This article, however, is confined
to a consideration of “government-assisted”11 permanent
resettlement through UNHCR.
Resettlement has a checkered past that predates the Refu-
gee Convention. The International Refugee Organization,
established in 1946, resettled over 1 million refugees be-
tween 1947 and 1951.12 In fact, resettlement was the tool of
choice of all refugee organizations that preceded
UNHCR.13 James Hathaway notes there was an assumption
during this earlier period that “there was little likelihood
that refugees would be accommodated in the first asylum
country.”14 As enshrined in Article 33(1), the Refugee Con-
vention shifted the focus of refugee protection to the prin-
ciple of non-refoulement. The boat people crisis of the 1970s
and early 1980s brought a resurgence in resettlement en-
thusiasm with 1.2 million Indo-Chinese resettled by
UNHCR between 1976 and 1989. Gary Troeller, a UNHCR
representative, reports that by the late 1970s UNHCR was
involved in the resettlement of 200,000 persons per year,
and that at one point in 1979 “resettlement was viewed as
the only viable solution for 1 in 20 of the global refugee
population under the responsibility of UNHCR.”15 Begin-
ning in the late 1980s however, resettlement came to be
viewed by UNHCR as the least preferred durable solution.
Concerns that large-scale resettlement was leading to the
abandonment of asylum in first countries and serving as a
pull factor for individuals to leave home for social and
economic reasons, combined with an increased emphasis
on voluntary repatriation following the end of the Cold
War, limited enthusiasm for resettlement.16 By 1996
UNHCR resettled only 1 in every 400 of the global refugee
population under its care.17
In its current reinvigorated state, UNHCR has pro-
claimed that resettlement “serves three equally important
functions:”
First, it is a tool to provide international protection and meet
the special  needs of individual refugees  whose life, liberty,
safety, health or other fundamental rights are at risk in the
country where they have sought refuge. Second, it is a durable
solution for larger numbers or groups of refugees, alongside the
other  durable  solutions  of  voluntary repatriation and local
integration. Third, it can be a tangible expression of interna-
tional solidarity and a responsibility sharing mechanism, allow-
ing States to help share each other’s burdens, and reduce
problems impacting the country of first asylum.”18
While the re-emergence of resettlement discourse is to be
applauded, the difficulty with UNHCR’s current tripartite
construction is that it risks sending resettlement into its own
dizzyingly schizophrenic identity crisis – uncertain of how
to actualize its role in an effective manner.
Resettlement is a useful tool for all three reasons enumer-
ated by UNHCR. Its malleability, however, also makes it
prone to manipulation. It can be, and has been, used by
states  to obfuscate an  unwillingness to meet  their legal
obligations under the Refugee Convention through a re-
placement of refugee protection by migrant selection. What
follows  can best  be termed “cautionary advocacy.” The
argument is first made that  resettlement is a necessary
component of refugee protection, particularly in the cur-
rent period of securitization following the events of 11
September 2001. This section is followed by a discussion of
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the dangers of the abusive use of resettlement to the overall
refugee protection scheme. Models for more structured
resettlement are then examined with  a  view  to at least
understanding what reform is needed. In conclusion, rec-
ommendations for resettlement reform are provided.
Why Resettlement?
UNHCR reported that by the end of 2005 the global number
of refugees was an estimated 8.7 million persons.19 One in
four of these refugees, 24 per cent, are in either Pakistan or
the Islamic Republic of Iran.20 In total, by UNHCR bureau
divisions, over 2.5 million refugees are hosted in Africa,
excluding North Africa, and almost another 2.5 million are
in CASWANAME, UNHCR’s bureau encompassing Central
Asia, South West Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East.
Europe hosts just under 2.0 million refugees and there are
over 800,000 in Asia and the Pacific. In the Americas, in total,
there are fewer than 600,000 refugees.21 The numbers high-
light “that refugees and mass movements are first and fore-
most a “developing country” problem and that the biggest
“donors” are in reality developing countries who put at risk
their fragile environment, economy, and society to provide
refuge to millions.”22 Matthew Gibney terms this uneven
distribution the “tyranny of geography.”23 In somewhat
more neutral parlance, it raises the issue of burden sharing.24
Following a review of the asylum policies of the US, Ger-
many, the UK, and Australia, Gibney writes:
…the limitations of  the current  international response are
rooted in the fact that states have failed to agree upon fair terms
for the distribution of responsibility for refugees (resulting in
huge inequalities in state burdens) and that most states are
content to ‘free ride’ off countries that have more inclusive
asylum policies…25
In addition to more inclusive policies, or conversely less
forceful interdiction, the “tyranny of geography” can be
taken to convey that certain countries, particularly those in
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East are simply closer to and
more easily accessed by refugee flows.
The Refugee Convention acknowledges the need for bur-
den sharing, considering in its Preamble “that the grant of
asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain coun-
tries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which
the United Nations has recognized the international scope
and nature cannot therefore be achieved without interna-
tional co-operation.”26 There is no further mention of bur-
den sharing in the Refugee Convention or in the subsequent
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 Proto-
col).27 Resettlement is by no means the only form of burden
sharing.  Many countries  also make  significant financial
contributions to refugee receiving countries and
UNHCR.28 One controversial argument by Peter Schuck,
for instance, recommends that all non-refugee producing
states be allocated a yearly quota of refugees for care or
resettlement that they can either absorb themselves or pay
another country to provide surrogate care.29 Goal 3(6) of
UNHCR’s Agenda for Protection, however, outlines the sig-
nificant role of resettlement in burden sharing:
3(6): Resettlement used more effectively as a tool of burden-
sharing.
– States to examine how more flexible resettlement criteria
could be applied with regard to refugees recognized on a prima
facie basis in mass displacement situations to whom Article 1 F
does not apply, coupled with, as appropriate, temporary hu-
manitarian evacuation programmes.
– The Working Group on Resettlement to examine further the
potential use of resettlement as a burden-sharing tool, which
would include the issue of criteria to be applied in mass dis-
placement situations, especially where the prospect of other
durable solutions is remote or absent.30
As of 1 March 2006, there were 147 states party to the Refugee
Convention or 1967 Protocol or both.31 Stretching to the
smallest numbers, there are a mere sixteen resettlement
countries with yearly resettlement numbers ranging from
53,813 in the US to 29 in Mexico.32 Gil Loescher and James
Milner note:
[t]he overwhelming majority of long-term refugees could be
eligible for resettlement, but a lack of resettlement opportuni-
ties, of resettlement staff to prepare submissions, and inefficien-
cies in the process of preparing and submitting resettlement
cases have  resulted  in the  under-utilisation of this  durable
solution.33
In its current incarnation, resettlement is not an effective
tool of burden sharing.
The argument for resettlement is difficult. Not because
the image of wasted lives in limbo is not compelling but
because it is not seen. It is as if the refugees have been
rendered invisible. Bill Frelick offers the following descrip-
tion of the reality for these individuals:
Millions of refugees worldwide have been relegated to a limbo
existence, warehoused in camps or settlements with no pros-
pects for voluntary repatriation or local integration. Children
born and raised within the confines of camps often never see
normal life outside the fences. These populations often become
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dependent and despondent, with predictably negative social
consequence.34
Highlighting the refugee’s invisibility, Jennifer Hyndman
argues that camps “remove evidence of human displace-
ment from view and contain ‘the problem’ without resolu-
tion, as noncommunities of the excluded.”35
For those left in the camps, rural outskirts, or apartment
complexes in urban corners, there is the assumption that
while not receiving government protection, refugees are
nonetheless within UNHCR’s protective bubble. To an
extent this assumption is true. These refugees are recog-
nized by UNHCR and receive protection under its man-
date. UNHCR is able to offer basic aid and assistance. As
Loescher explains: “UNHCR is identified primarily with
assistance – the delivery of food, shelter, and medicine – to
refugees and war-affected populations.”36 Hyndman notes,
though, that “UNHCR is careful not to make the camps too
attractive to potential refugees or other migrants by main-
taining minimum educational and other facilities, an ap-
proach that has been called ‘humane deterrence.’”37
While a comfortable camp environment and the chance
at resettlement risk serving as pull factors that encourage
migrant flows, these concerns are muted by the reality of
UNHCR’s powerlessness in the camp setting. Loescher in-
dicates:
The central importance of human rights protection of displaced
and threatened populations is frequently neglected. […] While
UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations are able to
deliver large quantities of humanitarian supplies under ex-
tremely difficult conditions, they are much less successful in
protecting civilians from human rights abuses…38
He adds, “host governments or dissident warlords ulti-
mately exercise control over the agency’s operational envi-
ronment.”39 In the chapter that follows Loescher’s article,
Arthur Helton recalls the image of soldiers from the “benign
refugee-hosting state” of Tanzania marching Rwandan refu-
gees back across the border at gunpoint in December 1996.40
Beyond invisibility, the primary difficulty with resettle-
ment is that it is undertaken by states on an entirely volun-
tary basis. Unlike the obligation on all signatory countries
not to refoule refugees at their borders, there is no require-
ment that signatory states bring refugees to their borders.
As Janet Dench notes, “[i]nstead of addressing how people
fleeing persecution might seek asylum in other countries,
the Refugee Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
focused on the obligation of states not to refoule a refugee
to persecution.”41 The Refugee Convention is,  therefore,
reactive in its structure. Resettlement in contrast is in Hel-
ton’s terms a “proactive refugee policy.”42 A coherent and
comprehensive refugee policy must be both proactive and
reactive.
This is an important point to highlight. An argument for
increased resettlement should not be interpreted as a criti-
cism of the principle of non-refoulement or as an argument
that it should be diminished in favour of increased resettle-
ment. What must be acknowledged is that the current world
climate means that there are increased obstacles to asylum
seekers reaching safe countries on their own. In the intro-
duction to UNHCR’s Global Consultations the editors note
that:
it has been noticeable that the post-September 11 context has
been  used to  broaden  the scope  of provisions of the 1951
Convention allowing refugees to  be  excluded  from refugee
status and/or to be expelled. The degree of collaboration be-
tweenimmigrationandasylumauthoritiesandthe intelligenceand
criminal law enforcement branches has also been stepped up.43
For Catherine Dauvergne, “[t]he worldwide fear of terror
has overlapped and intertwined with the fear of illegal mi-
gration.”44 Although intentions are difficult to gauge and
may be overlapping, it can safely be said that in some cir-
cumstances refugees are being targeted for exclusion while
in others they are the unintentional victims. I will deal with
the latter argument first and the former below under the
heading “Dangers of Abuse.”
While Article 31 of the Refugee Convention prevents the
imposition of penalties for illegal entry by asylum seekers,
it does not and cannot prevent a country from deterring
illegal entry – as this is, in many ways, the essence of
statehood.45 Refugees inevitably travel within mixed migra-
tory flows.46 There is no way in advance to decipher be-
tween legitimate refugees and economic migrants or even
potential terrorists for that matter. While this does not
legitimize the vilification of all migrants, it does pose a
conundrum for refugee protection. UNHCR reports a
measured decrease in the number of asylum claims regis-
tered in industrialized countries from 2004 to 2005 and
links the reduction to “increasingly restrictive national asy-
lum policies.”47
The intent of this article is neither to criticize nor support
these policies although their recent explosion is remark-
able.48 Rather, in the face of these policies, the argument is
that increased resettlement makes particular sense. Troeller
notes:
There is no necessary or proven correlation between increased
resettlement and a reduction in the number of those legiti-
mately or illegitimately seeking asylum. On the other hand,
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increased resettlement opportunities may reduce the motiva-
tion to move ‘irregularly’ in search of asylum.49
Further, as borders turn into barriers, legitimate asylum
seekers are finding it more and more difficult to find the
protection envisioned by the Refugee Convention. John Fre-
driksson, one of the few people writing directly on resettle-
ment, has therefore argued that “[i]n the aftermath of the
tragic events of 11 September, [resettlement] may prove to
be one of the most useful tools in the protection kit.”50
Joanne van Selm similarly suggests the post-11 September
security measures “could in fact benefit some of those people
seeking asylum and refuge by ensuring other, safer, means
of arrival, including the expansion of resettlement.”51
And indeed, according to Hathaway, there has been a
“recent renaissance of interest by some governments” in
resettlement schemes.52 The top three resettlement coun-
tries have traditionally been and continue to be the US,
Australia, and Canada.53 In 2005, Australia and Canada
each resettled approximately ten times the number of refu-
gees as Sweden, the fourth largest resettlement country, and
the US resettled more than fifty times Sweden’s resettle-
ment numbers.54 The issue, however, is whether resettle-
ment is truly being used as a tool of protection or as a tool
of selection and evasion – what non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs) have referred to as a “fig leaf for policies of
migration control.”55
Dangers of Abuse
It is not within the scope of this article to provide a compre-
hensive review and analysis of the instances and structures
of abuse that occur. Rather, what follows is a brief survey of
the top three resettlement countries – Canada, the US, and
Australia – and the difficulties with their current resettle-
ment schemes. This is followed by a comment on the UK,
which has recently initiated a resettlement program.56
Over the years the Canadian government has received
pointed critiques that its resettlement program amounted
to cherry-picking.57 With the enactment of the new Immi-
gration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) in 2001, the
Government of Canada claimed a shift in Canadian reset-
tlement policy toward protection rather than  ability to
establish.58 Through regulations under IRPA, the “success-
ful establishment” criterion that requires refugees to show
that they have good settlement potential is now waived for
refugees designated “vulnerable” or in “urgent need.”59
While a clear shift to need-based protection  in theory,
Michael Casasola notes that in the years preceding IRPA’s
enactment “the number of refugees facing urgent or emer-
gency protection concerns [was] actually quite small.”60 He
reports that in 1999 UNHCR referred only 114 urgent and
emergency submissions across all resettlement countries.61
As the Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR) reported in
its 2003 Report Card “[m]ost refugees seeking resettlement
in Canada still need to meet the ‘successful establishment’
requirement, undermining the program’s ability to offer
protection to those in need.”62 CCR goes on to note, “Can-
ada is the only resettlement country to formally exclude
refugees from resettlement based on their integration po-
tential.”63
At the same time, the threat, and even more, the fear of
terrorism has enabled government justification and sup-
port for restrictive policies. IRPA now ties protection to
proposals to be “tough on those who pose a threat to
Canadian security.”64 Reviewing the first incarnation of the
legislation that eventually became IRPA,65 Casasola noted:
Unfortunately the most negative aspect of the legislative pack-
age was that the many positive resettlement initiatives were
presented as a counter to some of the more punitive actions the
government planned in order to limit access to the refugee
determination system in Canada. In fact, the resettlement in-
itiatives became an important part of the selling of the bill to the
Canadian public. … Resettled refugees were presented as part
of the refugees using the ‘front door.’ And by providing refugees
greater access, Canada suggested it had the moral authority to
limit access to those refugees described  as using the  ‘back
door.’66
This desire for choice and control of refugee selection is
further emphasized in the US and Australian resettlement
schemes.
With respect to the US resettlement program, Gibney
succinctly describes it as “generous but not humanitar-
ian.”67 Gibney traces the role of lobby groups and foreign
policy considerations in determining the composition and
character of resettled refugees. He notes that as a discretion-
ary scheme “there has been no move in resettlement policy
to correspond with an attempt to expunge political prefer-
ences from asylum processes…”68 Van Selm adds:
The US resettlement programme is used to giving a strong level
of management, or the appearance thereof, to the arrival and
situation of refugees in the United States. The United States has
considerable power to choose which of the world’s refugees
become refugees in the United States, even if it is only selecting
some 80,000 to 90,000 out of 20 million annually. The mere fact
of such selection is linked not only to domestic policy concerns
about the acceptability of certain groups of refugees or the
appeal to public sympathies, but also to foreign policy concerns
expressed in terms of national interest in supporting allied
states.69
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She worries elsewhere that in the current period of securiti-
zation, resettlement, in the US at least, may be vulnerable to
targeted profiling.70 As Troeller cautions, expansion of re-
settlement must be developed in a way that “maintains its
primacy as a protection tool and that it not be shaped in
order to meet solely migration needs.”71
Australia, in contrast to Canada and the US, highlights a
more sinister side of resettlement. Australia makes an in-
tentional distinction between onshore asylum seekers and
offshore refugees, and formally links the intake from the
two categories. Refugee numbers are balanced in a way such
that the offshore intake is reduced when onshore claimants
increase.72 This scheme permits Australia the rhetoric of
repeatedly labelling those who arrive on its shores as “queue
jumpers” who compromise Australia’s ability to help the
“neediest” refugees still overseas.73 The essence of the argu-
ment, as put forth by Robert Illingworth, Assistant Secre-
tary Onshore Protection Branch of the Refugee
Humanitarian and International Division of Australia’s
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, is as
follows:
Do we really want Australia’s finite capacity to resettle those in
need to be taken up on the basis of decisions of organized
criminals about who they will ship to Australia? Or would we
want to use as many places as possible to resettle those people
identified as in greatest need of resettlement through coordi-
nated international efforts under the UNHCR?74
The argument is as attractive as it is misleading. Australia is
privileging resettlement over its obligation under the Refu-
gee Convention of non-refoulement.75 Human Rights Watch
has described Australia’s system as an attempt to grant
asylum “by invitation only.”76 While Canada and the US
may be using resettlement as a means of migrant selection
under a humanitarian guise,77 they are doing so in conjunc-
tion with the continued granting of inland/onshore asylum.
Australia is attempting to do so in lieu of inland/onshore
asylum. Nor does the scheme necessarily import order to the
process. The Refugee Council of Australia found the Austra-
lian program to offer not “a place in a queue but a ticket in
a lottery.”78 Moreover, the argument that the granting of
inland asylum encourages smugglers, traffickers, or “organ-
ized criminals” has been solidly countered. It has been ar-
gued that in fact it is the “restrictive immigration policies in
many industrialized States…[that] oblige economic mi-
grants and refugees alike to use irregular channels” thereby
stimulating the consequent growth in smuggling and traf-
ficking.79 British philosopher Sir Michael Dummett has ar-
gued restrictive laws leave refugees with “no other way of
escaping” and “the blame for the existence of these reviled
traffickers in human beings lies largely with the governments
that have erected the barriers the traffickers are helping
people to circumvent.”80
The UK began a resettlement program in coordination
with UNHCR in 2004.81 This immediately brought the UK
within UNHCR’s top ten resettlement countries.82 While
encouraging new resettlement countries is in UNHCR’s
interest, the background dialogue underlying the UK’s par-
ticipation is troubling. In a vein similar to the Australian
perspective, Jack Straw, while British Home Secretary, pro-
claimed in 1999 that the Refugee Convention was “no longer
working as its framers intended,” and suggested the Euro-
pean Union (EU) set up a program “under which an agreed
number of refugees – and possible others in need of protec-
tion – would be identified in their own regions and brought
to the EU for resettlement.”83 In February 2002 the Labour
Government issued a White  Paper, Secure Borders, Safe
Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain, which
included a proposal to develop a resettlement program with
the underlying intention that this would reduce asylum
claims and remove the demand for smugglers.84
As noted above, the principle of non-refoulement is es-
sential to refugee protection. The presumption of the Aus-
tralian and British governments that inland claims can be
replaced by comprehensive resettlement is in error. As is
discussed further in the final section of this article, resettle-
ment will never be comprehensive enough to absorb the
world’s refugees. Moreover, there will always be refugees
with the means, creativity, or sheer daring to make impos-
sible journeys and survive. The Tampa incident in Australia
in  2001 and the hijacking and rerouting of an internal
Ariana Airlines flight in Afghanistan to the UK in February
2000 are extreme examples of such measures.85 It is impos-
sible to ever deter people completely from “exercising their
human right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution in
another  country.”86 However, as access to such asylum
becomes more difficult to obtain,  even the less overtly
calculating approaches of Canada and the US to resettle-
ment must be more carefully scrutinized.
Fair Selection Models
Assuming integration and repatriation whenever possible, it
would be nice to imagine an ideal burden-sharing global
refugee pie where all the world’s remaining refugees were
fairly parcelled out. The unfortunate reality is that there is
neither the organization nor willingness to implement such
a program, even if one were to support Schuck’s model
where countries could buy out of their obligations.87 David
Martin of the Migration Policy Institute notes that “[w]e are
extremely unlikely in this new century to find the United
States or any other country willing to make an open-ended
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commitment to resettlement of virtually all who escape a
designated nation.”88 Former UNHCR High Commissioner
Ruud Lubbers suggested a burden-sharing ratio of one refu-
gee per 1,000 inhabitants.89 The suggestion, maintained by
UNHCR as an annual resettlement quota of 0.1 per cent of
a developed country’s existing population, was greeted with
silence by many governments.90 Fredriksson calculated that
this ratio would have meant a 387 per cent increase in the
2002 resettlement targets of the US, already the most gener-
ous resettlement country.91 Yet, even with increased reset-
tlement numbers there will always be the matter of selection.
If selections must be made, what is the best model on
which to base the selections? Little appears to have been
written in this area. Martin has prepared a comprehensive
report on US resettlement reform published in 2005. While
his recommendations are specifically directed to the US
scheme, his overall message is broadly applicable. He rec-
ommends that the US resettlement program should not be
…limited to rescue from grave life-threatening dangers but will
work actively to rescue displaced individuals and groups who
face a wider range of harms, including the wastage of human
potential  that can  result from protracted stay in  a  refugee
camp….the program can still be prudent and selective in choos-
ing among them, with full attention to countervailing factors
such as possible magnet effects, other political impacts, and near
term prospects for voluntary repatriation.92
In the Canadian context, Dauvergne, with Leonora An-
geles and Agnes Huang, notes that men outnumber women
in both Canada’s domestic refugee determinations and in
the government-assisted refugee resettlement category de-
spite evidence that women make up about half of the refu-
gees currently seeking protection internationally.93 While
Canada cannot control for the dominance of men in the
inland determination process, Dauvergne, Angeles, and
Huang recommend that the Canadian government imprint
a “somewhat crude equality measure” by ensuring “that
women outnumber men in the government-assisted refu-
gee category.”94
Fredriksson has proposed two, more international,
models. He premises his proposals on the argument ad-
dressed above – that increased security measures and bor-
der enforcement following 11 September have had the
consequent effect of reducing access to asylum. Fredriksson
argues that “changing realities demand changed ap-
proaches.”95 He proposes two potential models to “create a
coherent global system and…set in motion a transparent
programme…”96
The first model  would be  a formula-based  approach
factoring in length of time in an uncertain and non-durable
situation and the likelihood and feasibility of repatriation
in the foreseeable future.97 This is in line with UNHCR’s
official position on resettlement – that it is one of three
durable solutions alongside local integration and repatria-
tion. Martin sees the Agenda for Protection as further stress-
ing this need to “widen the resettlement horizon to include
refugees who might not be in immediate danger but for
whom no other long-term solution is in sight.”98 The sug-
gestion focuses resettlement on protracted refugee situ-
ations. UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as:
…one in which refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and
intractable state of limbo. Their lives may not be at risk, but their
basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological
needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile. A refugee in this
situation is often unable to break free from enforced reliance on
external assistance.99
UNHCR measures protracted situations as those in which
refugee populations of 25,000 persons or more have been in
exile in a developing country for five years or more.100 By
this calculation, UNHCR estimated that at the end of 2005
there were thirty-one different protracted situations in the
world, accounting for some 5.2 million refugees.101
Resettlement should not be viewed as the presumed
solution for refugees in protracted situations. Engagement
is required with both the host country and the country of
origin to ideally achieve local integration or repatriation.102
Loescher and Milner note that comprehensive solutions for
protracted refugee situations “would employ the full range
of possible solutions for refugees – repatriation and reinte-
gration, local integration in the host country, and resettle-
ment in a third country.”103 Only when circumstances make
the other options unviable should resettlement be consid-
ered. A timeframe for determining other solutions to be
unviable is, unfortunately, difficult and situation-specific.
Troeller makes the suggestion that resettlement could be
used as a “safety-valve” to assist countries of first asylum.104
This metaphor however fails to capture the essence of re-
sponsibility sharing as it suggests waiting until countries of
first asylum reach a sort of boiling point before assistance
is offered. Further, for 2005, UNHCR reported that the
global number of refugees accepted for resettlement
reached 80,800105 – barely over 1.5 per cent of the pro-
tracted numbers. These numbers are troublingly low. As
Loescher and Milner indicate, there is an “increasingly dire
lack of protection for millions of refugees.”106 Thus, even
supposing massive  increases in the number  of  refugees
countries are willing to accept for resettlement, eligibility
would still require situation-specific evaluations and time-
frame determinations, while the number of eligible refugees
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would presumably still demand further selection decisions.
Fredriksson’s first model therefore offers little real guidance
on how resettlement refugees should be chosen.
As an alternative, Fredriksson suggests a second model
in which resettlement need is defined on a group basis.
Martin considers this the “key” to “enhancing the pace” of
US resettlement expansion.107 In 2003 Canada piloted a
group resettlement project in which individual assessments
were bypassed with 780 Sudanese and Somali refugees from
Kenyan refugee camps. Approximately 1,000 Afghans came
from Central Asia under the same program in 2004 and 810
Burmese refugees from Thailand were resettled over fall
2006 and early 2007.108 Since 2004, UNHCR has submitted
thirteen refugee groups (43,000 refugees) for resettlement
consideration from asylum countries in Africa, the Middle
East, and Central and Eastern Asia.109 The theory behind
the new system for group resettlement is that it will reduce
processing time and create ready-made support systems for
arriving refugees.
The question raised by the Canadian project is how these
groups are selected. While these groups are undeniably
deserving refugees, why were they chosen over other equally
deserving groups? The concern, often heard in the Ameri-
can context, is that resettlement is too greatly influenced by
interest groups.110 Adding to the concerns, Savitri Taylor
notes:
The problem with relying on situation-specific agreements be-
ing negotiated on an ad hoc basis is that success is made depend-
ent on the existence of a political will to undertake each specific
exercise. As the Assistant High Commissioner has noted, “com-
prehensive arrangements have not been always pursued even
for refugee situations that warranted them.” While it makes
sense to negotiate situation-specific agreements in the short-
term where the political will clearly exists, doing so should not
beasubstitute for the long-termgoalofnegotiatinganon-situation
specific multilateral agreement on responsibility-sharing.111
The model is also extremely susceptible to the modes of
abuse voiced by van Selm and Troeller. As Taylor notes,
though, this is not to say this model should be discarded.
Effective processing that makes resettlement more attractive
and affordable to the receiving countries should be encour-
aged in the hopes of encouraging the acceptance of increased
numbers. What is currently lacking is a transparent and
systematic structure for group selection.
A further model, not noted by Fredriksson, is need-based
acceptance. Rather than addressing the “profound wastage
of human lives” noted by Martin in protracted situations,
need-based criteria target specific refugee types. UNHCR’s
resettlement criteria focus on eight elements: legal and
physical protection needs, medical needs, survivors of vio-
lence and torture, women-at-risk, family reunification,
children and  adolescents,  elderly  refugees,  and  refugees
without local integration prospects.112 From UNHCR’s
global position, urgent need-based resettlement becomes a
juggling act – looking at refugees and determining which
country, each with distinct priorities and claim processes,
will be the most likely to take an individual. In contrast to
group resettlement, this model lends itself to detailed indi-
vidual assessments of need.113
These differing models, all well-intentioned and high-
lighting valid areas of resettlement need, return us to reset-
tlement’s schizophrenic dilemma. The solution, I submit,
is a top-down approach coming from UNHCR that ac-
knowledges the validity of all of the above models. This
acknowledgement should come through operational
guidelines and criteria for each type of resettlement that as
Fredriksson laments “are now virtually absent from the
UNHCR Resettlement Handbook.”114 The percentage of
resettlement from protracted situations should be estab-
lished as well as whether all or some of protracted resettle-
ment should be through group resettlement – a sort of
melding of Fredriksson’s models. UNHCR’s need-based
resettlement is already well-structured but should not be
privileged in a way that relegates protracted and group
resettlement to ad hoc secondary arrangements. The two
models should be running parallel with states encouraged
to take in refugees from both streams and clear processes
for how to do so. The “crude equality measure” proposed
by Dauvergne, Angeles, and Huang should likewise be
transposed to the international scheme. Nothing in these
models would prevent situation-specific considerations of
whether resettlement is appropriate. All these models can
be intermingled and combined in a complementary man-
ner. What is needed is transparent planning and coordina-
tion from UNHCR.
UNHCR should likewise be more vocal in encouraging
not just resettlement but resettlement quotas correlated to
population density, gross domestic product, or some other
agreed standard. While UNHCR cannot oblige states to
take on their recommended numbers, a more emphatic
statement by UNHCR would at least serve to highlight the
low current resettlement numbers, even by the traditional
resettlement countries. Further, more direction from
UNHCR on resettlement distribution could lead to an in-
creased willingness by states, and their citizens, for greater
refugee resettlement. Gibney argues that “[a] well-publi-
cized and transparent system for dealing with refugee bur-
dens could only add to the legitimacy of international
arrangements for protecting refugees...”115 Van Selm adds
that resettlement, once started, “has a ‘knock on’ effect –
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meaning that the public gets more information and under-
stands more about the situations from which both resettled
refugees and asylum seekers have fled.”116 From the per-
spective of cost analysis, an issue not explored here but
highly relevant, Loescher highlights that “international co-
operation and collective action through resettlement shar-
ing” would enable “clarity, consistency and lower
transaction costs” for states.117
Conclusion
In concluding, I offer six recommendations based on the
above analysis. The recommendations are intended to initi-
ate dialogue leading to a comprehensive resettlement model.
Actors from several sides can aid visibility, promote real
change, and increase resettlement numbers. In addition to
UNHCR, national governments, academics, and activists
can prompt action. The recommendations that follow are
therefore directed either generally at these four groups or,
when specified, to individual actors.
Recommendations
1. Resettlement and non-refoulement must be complemen-
tary tools of protection. There is no refugee queue and only
one door. Images and allusions to queue-jumping and
entrance through the back door are misleading and detri-
mental to responsible protection. Both resettlement and
non-refoulement are imperfect but necessary protection
tools. Any increased focus on resettlement must not be in
exchange for reduced access to asylum or an abandonment
of the commitment to non-refoulement.
2. Global resettlement numbers should be increased. The
“tyranny of geography” and locational (dis)advantage
mean that certain countries are unfairly bearing the respon-
sibility for the majority of refugee flows, counter to the
commitment in the Refugee Convention to burden sharing.
Heightened securitization in the face of increased terrorist
threats since  2001  has  concomitantly  reduced  access  to
Western states. It is therefore becoming increasingly diffi-
cult for asylum seekers to reach safe states and trigger the
legal obligation of non-refoulement. Legally legitimate re-
ductions of asylum claims through increased border moni-
toring add force to the argument that resettlement numbers
should be increased to combat unfair and often crippling
refugee distribution.
3. UNHCR should set and encourage resettlement quotas
correlated to some agreed standard. The current absence of
any recognized resettlement quota is unacceptable. A clear
statement by UNHCR on ideal resettlement distribution,
be it by population density, gross domestic product, or
some combination of measurements, would draw attention
to the reality that the traditional resettlement countries, in
fact, resettle very few refugees. While UNHCR cannot en-
force increases, more direction may convince states, and
their citizens, to undertake greater refugee resettlement.
4. Resettlement selection must reflect refugee protection and
not national interests. The appeal of resettlement is often
tied to a nation’s notion that it offers a degree of control
over refugee protection in contrast to the unpredictable
nature of non-refoulement. Unlike the obligation imposed
by non-refoulement to accept those who arrive at the state’s
“door,” resettlement provides the ability to select for whom
the “door” will be opened. While selection is an unavoid-
able aspect of resettlement, mechanisms must be in place
to ensure that selection is committed to refugee needs and
not a nation’s interest in selecting the “best” refugees – the
healthiest, most educated, most compatible, most similar
to regular and desirable immigrants.
5. UNHCR should design a top-down model and opera-
tional guidelines for resettlement selection. While UNHCR
cannot force compliance with its recommendations, it can
and should provide a more comprehensive model and op-
erational guidelines to which states can choose to subscribe.
The appeal of such a structure is the simplicity, consistency
and transparency of selection, reducing the scope for criti-
cism, political influence and corruption. Moreover, such a
model would provide a measure against which states could
gauge their current selections and recognize gaps in their
schemes.
6. A resettlement model should incorporate need-based,
protracted, and group resettlement. UNHCR currently fo-
cuses resettlement on eight need-based criteria. While ideal
for urgent and priority cases, the criteria fail to provide a
comprehensive resettlement scheme. In addition to urgent
need situations, protracted refugee groups exist in ever-
worsening and volatile conditions of limbo that must be
addressed. Group resettlement that reduces processing
time and creates ready-made support systems for arriving
refugees deserves increased attention and coordination. A
resettlement model should incorporate both need-based
and protracted resettlement, the latter through group proc-
essing.
UNHCR recognizes the need for the type of resettlement
scheme proposed herein. Two goals of the Agenda for Pro-
tection are for “States that offer resettlement opportunities
to consider increasing their resettlement quotas, diversify-
ing their intake of refugee groups, and introducing more
flexible resettlement criteria,”118 and for “States and
UNHCR to explore the feasibility of establishing a central
biometric registration system to support the identification
of refugees in need of resettlement.”119 This article can
hopefully add to the dialogue that will bring these goals
closer to reality.
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